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I. INTRODUCTION
In the past several years, environmental plaintiffs have watched courts
apply Section 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act in a manner sup-
porting the idea that "[s]ection 706 of the APA, which specifies standards
of review for... agency determinations, is a disorderly mess of ambiguous
and overlapping standards."' Plaintiffs bringing claims under section 706(1)
of the APA have found themselves awash in a sea of judicial inconsistency,
as courts debated and backpedaled over the meanings of "final action" and
"failure to act." This confusion has been especially apparent in public land
management cases on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The source of the uncertainty most likely derives from the statute itself.
While section 706(2) of the APA allows a court to set aside final agency
action that is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or... short of
statutory right, ' 2 section 706(1) allows a court to compel agency action,
where the agency has "unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed" ac-
tion.3 For example, under section 706(2) a court may set aside a final
agency action, such as the decision to conduct a timber sale, if the agency
took that action without complying with applicable statutory standards-
such as the requirement that it prepare an Environmental Impact Statement
("EIS") under the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA").4 Under
section 706(1), a court may compel action unlawfully withheld or unrea-
sonably delayed. An action may be considered unlawfully withheld, if, for
example, an agency is required by statute to file a report, and fails to do so.
An action may be considered unlawfully withheld if it violates a date-
specific deadline; it is unreasonably delayed if it violates a non date-
specific deadline.5
Because relief is unavailable under section 706(2) unless an agency has
taken discrete "final action, ' 6 and unavailable under section 706(1) unless
* J.D. 2004, University of Montana School of Law, Missoula, Montana.
1. Gordon G. Young, Judicial Review of Informal Agency Action on the Fiftieth Anniversary of
the APA: The Alleged Demise and Actual Status of Overton Park's Requirement of Judicial Review "On
the Record," 10 Admin. L. J. Am. U. 179, 181 (Spring 1996).
2. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2004) [hereinafter "APA"].
3. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2004).
4. See Idaho Sporting Congress v. Thomas, 137 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 1998).
5. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Norton, 301 F.3d 1217, 1226 n. 5 (10th Cir. 2002).
6. "Two conditions must be met for administrative action to be considered final under APA 704:
(1) Action should mark the consummation of agency's decision making process; and (2) action should
be one by which rights or obligations have been determined or from which legal consequences flow."
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177 (1997).
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an agency has failed to act, claims brought where an agency took partial,
allegedly inadequate action towards a congressionally mandated goal can
fall into limbo. Indeed, "[t]he dividing line between agency action that has
been unlawfully withheld and is therefore subject to mandatory injunction
and an agency failure to act that is not yet reviewable as final agency action
is not always clear.",
7
Both the Ninth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals have recently, and
correctly, identified agency recalcitrance in the face of a clear statutory duty
as the standard for section 706(1) threshold jurisdiction in situations where
an agency has taken partial action. In both Montana Wilderness Association
v. United States Forest Service8 and Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v.
Norton,9 these courts held agencies failed to act under their statutory man-
dates to preserve the wilderness qualities of several wilderness study areas.
Although both the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management
("BLM") claimed to have taken action towards statutorily mandated goals,
the courts characterized those efforts as half-steps that could not be consid-
ered meaningful action.' 0 Although both agencies argued the actions they
had taken removed their shortcomings from section 706(1) jurisdiction, the
courts identified the crux of the issue in the following manner: the agencies
had a duty to act, and failed to do so in any meaningful way. Both courts
have held that partial action and "half-steps" towards a congressionally
mandated goal constitute a failure to act."
Opponents of judicial review of agency inaction (for example, the federal
government) argue this trend inappropriately widens judicial review, allow-
ing courts to invade arenas properly left to executive expertise and discre-
tion.12 Nonetheless, "administrative inaction occurs at least as often as ad-
ministrative action [and] its effects can be just as influential."' 3 Agencies
often set policy by doing nothing at all.' 4 The APA's framers did not intend
ambiguities in sections 706(1) and 706(2) to serve as loopholes, allowing
agencies that made "half-steps" towards compliance with statutory mandate
to evade judicial review. Nor did Congress intend its land management leg-
islation to be effectively ignored by agencies giving mere lip service to
statutory mandate. Invoking jurisdiction under section 706(1) jurisdiction,
where an agency has taken only partial actions towards statutory compli-
7. George Cameron Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman, Flexible Deference I Pub. Nat. Resources
L. § 8:24 n. 2 (2004).
8. 314 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter MWA].
9. 301 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter SUWA].
10. See MWA, 314 F.3d 1146 at 1151; SUWA, 301 F.3d 1217 at 1236.
11. Id.
12. Br. of Pet. at 18, Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance - U.S. - (forthcoming 2004).
13. Peter H. A. Lehner, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 627, 689
(1983).
14. Catherine Zaller, The Case for Strict Statutory Construction of Mandatory Agency Deadlines
under Section 706(1), 42 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1545, 1545-46 (2001).
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ance, is appropriate and necessary to give regulations the power Congress
intended them to wield, for:
When the will of Congress is not properly implemented,
people lose both the benefit of legislative action and faith
in the ability of the government to effectuate social change.
Judicial review of agency nonimplementation of a statute is
both necessary and proper to give effect to the congres-
sional intent and to assure the legitimacy of the administra-
tive system.1
5
This article examines the Ninth Circuit's evolution in its approach to sec-
tion 706(1) claims brought by environmental plaintiffs in the past decade.
Part two discusses the text and legislative history of the APA, asserting that
review of agency inaction, even where an agency has taken some action, is
consistent with the framers' intent to attain a balance and separations of
powers in government through broad judicial review, and not to create vast
categories of unreviewable inaction. Part three discusses recent cases on the
Ninth Circuit, illustrating the difficulties courts face in determining review
under section 706(1), as well as a Tenth Circuit case, whose appeal has
taken these issues to the U.S. Supreme Court. Part four discusses the gov-
ernment's arguments on appeal, and concludes that the Ninth and Tenth
Circuit's views on section 706(1) jurisdiction are consistent with the APA's
purpose, "to afford a remedy for every legal wrong."'
16
II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
The text of the APA, its legislative history, and section 706(1)'s roots in
the mandamus action, show Congress intended to provide judicial review
when agencies fail to act despite a legislative mandate. Although some
common law has characterized section 706(1) "failure to act" provisions as
very narrow, carefully delineated exceptions to the final action require-
ments of section 706(2), 7 a careful reading of the text shows congress
clearly intended courts to hold agencies accountable for inaction, especially
recalcitrance in the face of a clear duty. A more restrictive reading, render-
ing judicial review unavailable where an agency has taken some action, or
given lip service to a Congressional mandate, flies in the face of the balance
of powers doctrine, and Congressional intent.
Neither the history nor the text of the APA, however, is always straight-
forward. The passage of the APA has been characterized in recent scholar-
15. Lehner, supra n. 13, at 689.
16. See H.R. Rpt. 1980 at 251 (May 3, 1946); Sen. Rept. 752 at 193 (Nov. 19, 1945).
17. Br. of Respt. Utah Shared Access Alliance, et. al., at 10-11, Norton v. Southern Utah Wilder-
ness Alliance -_ U.S. -_ (forthcoming 2004) (citing Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871
(1990)).
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ship as "nothing less than a pitched political battle for the life of the New
Deal."'18 As proponents and opponents of the bill debated and finally com-
promised to produce the APA, they left some provisions, notably those out-
lining judicial review, purposefully vague.19 Notwithstanding sometimes
vague statutory language, the framers' intent to afford a remedy for every
legal wrong remains clear.
A. Text of the Administrative Procedure Act
Although the text of the Administrative Procedure Act does not define
final agency action, it clearly provides remedy for agency inaction. It is
necessary to look at the APA's judicial review provisions, and their "over-
lapping standards, 20 before engaging in debate concerning threshold juris-
diction under section 706(1).
The APA is a jurisdictional statute, providing the framework for judicial
review when an agency is accused of violating statutory mandate. It does
not provide an independent source of judicial review, but must be used in
conjunction with another statute. A look at the text of the judicial review
portions of the APA shows Congress indeed "intentionally wrote some pro-
visions broadly to provide courts with a measure of flexibility in interpret-
ing the Act.'
Section 701 enunciates the purpose of the APA's judicial review provi-
sions, which is to provide review unless precluded by statute, or unless
"agency action is committed to agency discretion by law. 22 Section 702
states the broad principal that "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within
the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof., 23
Section 706 provides guidelines for the scope of judicial review of
agency action, and inaction.24 Under section 706(1), a court may "compel
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed." Section
706(2) allows a court to
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to
be-
(a) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or oth-
erwise not in accordance with law;
18. George Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New
Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1557, 1560 (1996).
19. John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 113, 130
(1998).
20. Young, supra n. 1.
21. Duffy, supra n. 19.
22. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2004).
23. Id. at § 702.
24. Id. at § 706.
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(b) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or
immunity;
(c) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations, or short of statutory right...
Importantly, section 704 restricts judicial review under the APA to "final
agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in court. 26 This
has become an important element of the debate over section 706(1) jurisdic-
tion-agencies argue that because they have taken some measures to effect
a statutory goal, they have neither taken a final action under section 706(2),
nor completely failed to act under section 706(1). The statute, however,
does not define "final" agency action. To add to the confusion, an agency's
failure to act is listed as an example of agency action.27
The definitions of the terms used in the APA's judicial review provisions
are found in section 551 of the APA. "Agency action" is defined to include
"the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief or the
equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act..., 28 This list, rather than serv-
ing as an exhaustive and exclusive enumeration, merely gives examples of
agency actions subject to judicial review.
Sections 706(1) and 706(2) are the provisions applied by plaintiffs most
often in administrative law. 29 However, distinctions between the two provi-
sions can blur, where agency action is defined to include a failure to act.3°
The principle that judicial review must be limited to final agency action
becomes less clear when applied to agency inaction. Must inaction be a
"final" inaction, or must the action the agency was supposed to have taken
itself be a final action to trigger review under section 706(1)? The text of
the APA, and common law, suggest the former. Section 704 limits judicial
review to "final agency action," which, when applied to section 551(13),
would provide that courts may review any final failure to act.31 Moreover,
the Supreme Court has held that finality is to be determined in a "prag-
32matic," "flexible" manner. Despite the apparently overlapping standards
of sections 706(1) and 706(2), the text of the APA clearly provides distinct
remedies for both agency action and inaction.
25. Id. at § 706 (1), (2).
26. Id. at § 704.
27. Id. at § 551 (13).
28. Id. (emphasis added).
29. Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Guide to Federal Agency Rulemaking 316 (3d ed., American Bar Asso-
ciation 1998).
30. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13).
31. Br. of Amici Curiae Professors of Administrative and Environmental Law in Support of Resp.
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, et. al. at 11, Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance __ U.S.
- (forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter Br. of Amici Curiae].
32. Abbot Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149-50 (1967).
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B. Legislative History of the Administrative Procedure Act
Much of the confusion related to applying sections 706(1) and 706(2)
may lie in the APA's embattled history. Congress enacted the APA in 1946
in response to the myriad regulations of the New Deal. Politicians who op-
posed New Deal politics "wanted to ensure judicial review of agency deci-
sions, while [proponents of the New Deal] wanted agency autonomy.,
33
The terms of the APA were hotly contested, judicial review especially so.
In the end, the APA was cast as a mere "restatement" of existing common
law-a creature with something less than the force of a true statute.34
The APA became a compromise in which courts regulated agencies, but
left the agencies broad decision-making discretion.35 However, the legisla-
tive history of the APA indicates Congress intended courts to compel agen-
cies to implement legislation. In their final report of 1941, the Attorney
General's Committee on Administrative Procedure noted that judicial re-
view was rarely available to compel effective enforcement of the law by
administrators, and that "the problems of whether the administrator's re-
fusal to take action is reviewable remains., 36 The APA as it was finally
drafted addressed this problem. Although earlier bills introduced while
Congress considered the APA gave the issue of agency inaction short shrift,
the bill that ultimately passed contained broad judicial review provisions,
consistent with the framers' intent to "afford a remedy for every legal
wrong." 37 The Committee report on this bill, S.7, a Bill to Improve the Ad-
ministration of Justice by Prescribing Fair Administrative Procedures, ad-
dressed the problem of agencies ignoring congressional guidelines. The bill
defined agency action to include "failure to act," and noted that this defini-
tion was intended to "assure complete coverage of every form of agency
power, proceeding, action or inaction. 38
The Attorney General's Manual on the APA also discussed the passage
of the APA's judicial review clause, noting "the purpose of the bill was to
give the courts a tool with which they could force the agency to act accord-
ing to congressional will. ' 39 Lawmakers who passed the APA intended sec-
tion 706(1) to provide a remedy for "lengthy delays resulting in a circum-
vention of legislation'4--whether or not those delays were accompanied
by partial action.
33. Zaller, supra n. 14, at 1573 n. 12.
34. Id. at 1550.
35. Id. at 1573.
36. Br. of Amici Curiae, supra n. 31, at 6 (citing Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure, Final Report 76 (1941)).
37. H.R. Rept., supra n. 16.
38. See Sen. Rept., supra n. 16, at 197-198.
39. Zaller, supra n. 14, at 1549.
40. Id.
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III. CASE LAW
Recent trends on the Ninth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals may sig-
nal a changing judicial view of section 706(1) jurisdiction. Although some
courts maligned section 706(1) "failure to act" claims in the 1990's as "suf-
ficiency claims"- lawsuits in which whiny plaintiffs could "dress up" al-
most any objection to an agency action as an agency's failure to act-'
recently, both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have proven friendlier to 706(1)
claims. In SUWA, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held "the mere fact
the BLM ha[d] taken some action to address impairment [of Wilderness
Study Areas' wilderness characteristics] is not sufficient, standing alone, to
remove this case from section 706(1) review...,42 Soon after, in MWA, the
Ninth Circuit held "[t]he simple fact that the Forest Service has taken some
action to address [its statutory obligation] is not sufficient to remove this
case from section 706(1) review.' '43 Both courts addressed situations in
which agencies took partial action towards compliance with a statutory
mandate. To these courts, the cup containing the agency's action was half
empty rather than half full-the agencies apparently had failed to act to a
greater degree than they had acted. The courts focused on the agencies'
omissions rather than commissions, signaling a change from earlier inter-
pretations of the scope of section 706 judicial review, and raising the ques-
tion of exactly how much action could still be considered "inaction" under
section 706(1). Although courts clearly must analyze the action an agency
has taken in a section 706(1) case, these cases show the correct question for
threshold jurisdiction is that of whether the agency had a clear statutory
duty to act, and whether the agency's omissions constitute a failure to com-
ply with that duty.
A. Ecology Center
For example, in Ecology Center v. United States Forest Service,44 plain-
tiff environmental group brought both section 706(1) and 706(2) claims
against the Forest Service, alleging both that the Forest Service's inade-
quate monitoring efforts should be construed as final agency action, and
that the Forest Service failed to act by inadequately monitoring the
Kootenai National Forest ("KNF") as required by its Forest Management
Plan. Under the National Forest Management Act ("NFMA"), the Forest
Service was required "to manage the national forests by preparing 'land and
resource management plans' to guide land use management on each for-
41. Public Citizen v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 845 F.2d 1105, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also
Nevada v. Watkins, 939 F.2d 710, 714 n. 11 (9th Cir. 1991); Ecology Center Inc. v. United States Forest
Serv., 192 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 1999).
42. SUWA, 301 F.3d 1217 at 1230-31.
43. MWA,314F.3d 1146at 1151.
44. 192 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 1999).
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est.' '45 The KNF adopted the Kootenai National Forest Plan ("Plan") in
1987, and the terms of the Plan required the Forest Service to produce regu-
lar reports containing monitoring data46 that would enable the Forest Ser-
vice to make "periodic determinations and evaluations of the effects of
management practice. 4 7 The Forest Service published reports, as required
by the Plan, every year except 1988 and 1993, and following the years it
missed, published combined two-year reports.48
Plaintiff contended the Forest Service's failure to monitor the KNF in ac-
cordance with the Plan constituted a "final agency action," triggering juris-
diction under section 706(2). 49 The court disagreed, characterizing the For-
est Service's actions as "only steps leading to an agency decision, rather
than the final action itself.' 50 The court cited to the Supreme Court's Bennet
v. Spear test, holding the following two conditions must be met for an ad-
ministrative action to be considered final under the APA: "(1) the action
should mark the consummation of the agency's decision making process;
and (2) the action should be one by which rights or obligations have been
determined or from which legal consequences flow."5' Here, the court rea-
soned plaintiffs could not meet the Bennet v. Spear criteria, where monitor-
ing (the complained-of action) was several steps removed from final agency
action, and where although monitoring was a mandatory duty under the
Plan, legal consequences did not necessarily flow from that duty, nor did
rights or obligations arise from it.52 Although plaintiff contended it suffered
actionable harm as a result of the Forest Service's inadequate monitoring,
which prevented plaintiff from obtaining information necessary to partici-
pate in overseeing the Forest Service's actions under NFMA, the court
found that because NFMA did not provide for any public participation re-
quirements in the conduct of monitoring, plaintiff "demand[ed] general
judicial review" of the Forest Service's day-to-day operations.53
The court also dismissed plaintiff's section 706(1) claim, holding plain-
tiff could not show a genuine failure to act.54 Here, the court chided plaintiff
for attempting "to evade the finality requirement with complaints about the
sufficiency of an agency action 'dressed up' as agency's failure to act."
55
45. Id. at 923 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (1996)).
46. Id. at 924 (noting, "[t]he Plan set forth 39 specific parameters-such as trends in recreation,
wildlife habitat and populations, recovery of endangered species, acres of noxious weed infestation, and
acres of timber harvest-to be monitored on an annual, biannual or quarterly basis, subject to the avail-
ability of funds").
47. 192 F.3d at 923-24 (citing 36 C.F.R. § 219.11).
48. Id. at 924.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 925
51. Id. (citing Bennet v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177 (1997)).
52. Id. at 925.
53. Id. (citing Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 899 (1990).
54. Id. at 926.
55. Id. (citing Nevada v. Watkins, 939 F.2d 710, 714 (9th Cir. 1990)).
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The court held although the Forest Service had "failed to conduct its duty in
strict conformance with the Plan and with NFMA Regulations," plaintiff
had not pleaded a genuine section 706(1) claim, because the Forest Service
had "performed extensive monitoring and provided detailed reports re-
counting its observations. 56 Because the court did not want to "discourage
the Forest Service from constructing ambitious Plans by holding them to
those plans too strictly..." it affirmed the lower court's decision, and held
plaintiff failed to establish jurisdiction under either section 706(1) or sec-
tion 706(2). 7
To the Ecology Center court, the glass was half full rather than half
empty-although the Forest Service may not have obeyed its statutory
mandate to the letter, it satisfied the court that it had acted to a greater de-
gree than it had failed to act. Moreover, the Ecology Center court character-
ized the Forest Service's duty under NFMA as aspirational rather than
mandatory, stating, "to hold the Forest Service liable under § 706(1) for
each oversight.., would discourage the Forest Service from producing am-
bitious forest plans. '58 The Ecology Center court not only emphasized the
importance of the action the Forest Service had taken towards its goals
mandated by NFMA, it de-emphasized the importance of NFMA' s mandate
to formulate and adhere to forest plans, and the need for the Forest Service
to adhere to its own regulations.
B. ONRC Action
In ONRC Action v. Bureau of Land Management, plaintiff environmental
organizations brought a failure to act claim against the BLM, but did so
under section 706(2) rather than section 706(1) of the APA.59 Plaintiffs
relied on section 551(13)'s inclusion of "failure to act" in the APA's defini-
tion of agency action, claiming that the BLM failed to act when it refused to
change the status quo on BLM lands awaiting an EIS, and by refusing to
institute a moratorium on projects that would impact future ecosystem man-
agement strategies on BLM land.
In 1994, the Forest Service and BLM proposed to develop an ecosystem
management system for public lands east of the Cascade Mountains in Ore-
gon and Washington, in response to President Clinton's mandate "to de-
velop a scientifically sound and ecosystem-based strategy for management
of these lands., 60 To this end, the Forest Service and BLM were to conduct
an EIS to generate alternatives that could be selected and result in amend-




59. 150 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1998).
60. Id. at 1134.
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("RMP"). 61 During the EIS development process, the Forest Service im-
plemented an interim screening process for proposed forest sales to pre-
serve alternatives on the lands it administered, but the BLM did not take
62similar action.
Plaintiffs filed a petition with the BLM, requesting a moratorium on old
growth logging activities, certain land exchanges, and juniper eradication,
in order to preserve alternatives while the EIS was pending.63 Plaintiffs
argued BLM's refusal to institute the moratorium constituted a violation of
the NEPA, which requires the preservation of alternatives during the EIS
process. 64 BLM responded to plaintiffs' petition with a two-page letter,
indicating that plaintiffs needed to raise their concerns in site-specific chal-
lenges to individual projects, and BLM was continuing its actions under its
existing program statements.65
ONRC argued the decision not to change the status quo was a final
agency action challengeable under the APA, relying on two U.S. Supreme
Court cases that held certain inaction equated to agency action.66 The court,
however, distinguished the cases, because there, the lack of action was
based on an evaluation of the merits and a reasoned decision not to act.
67
The court found that here, where "plaintiffs failed to point to 'a single BLM
order or regulation, or even to a completed universe of particular BLM or-
ders and regulations,' there was no agency action on which to base their
challenge under the APA. 6 8 Plaintiffs had attempted to force BLM into a
reviewable final action by submitting the petition, but the court found that
even the agency's response to the petition did not qualify as a final action,
because BLM never entered into an evaluative process in answering the
petition.69 Rather, the response letter was informational in nature.
Here, the Ninth Circuit focused on whether the agency had made a rea-
soned, deliberate decision to act or not to act. It found that because plain-
tiffs could not "point to a deliberate decision to act or not to take action," it
could not demonstrate BLM had taken a final agency action, regardless of




64. Id. at 1134-35.
65. Id. at 1135.
66. Id. at 1136 (citing City of Chicago v. United States, 396 U.S. 162, 166-67, 90 S.Ct. 309 (hold-
ing that agency decision not to take action was not "inaction" but rather a decision on the merits result-
ing in a reviewable agency action); Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 140-42, 59
S.Ct. 754 (eliminating the distinction between "affirmative orders" and "negative orders" because "dis-
missing a complaint on the merits and maintaining the status quo is an exercise of administrative func-
tion, no more and no less, than an order directing some change in status").
67. Id.
68. Id. (citing Lujan, 497 U.S. at 890).
69. Id. at 1136.
70. Id. at 1137.
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The court also addressed the issue of whether or not BLM had failed to
take actions mandated by NEPA and the Federal Land Policy Management
Act ("FLPMA"). Although the court cited to section 706(1) of the APA,
plaintiffs tried to obtain judicial review of agency inaction via section
706(2).7 1 Because section 551(13) defines agency inaction as a "failure to
act," plaintiffs attempted to attack the agency's inaction under section
706(2). This tactic was unsuccessful. The court focused on whether BLM
had a clear duty to act under NEPA or FLPMA-which it concluded BLM
did not, because NEPA gave only a qualified mandate that BLM should
take no action that would adversely impact the environment while an EIS
for a new management plan was pending.7 Because an existing manage-
ment plan covered the lands at issue while the EIS was pending, the court
found BLM's actions fit into an exception articulated under the regulations
interpreting NEPA-the action in question was covered by an existing pro-
gram statement.73 The court also disagreed with plaintiffs' contention that
BLM shirked its duty under FLPMA, to "adequately monitor and update its
management pans before relying on them in making land management sys-
",74tems. Again, as in Ecology Center, the court found the applicable stat-
ute-here, FLPMA-did not provide a statement of clear statutory duty, but
",75rather "general guidance during decisions on management actions...
Because ONRC could not convince the court BLM had taken any final
actions, or failed to meet any clear statutory duty under NEPA or FLPMA,
the court concluded it had no statutory standing under the APA.76 Again,
the court construed statutory language as providing guidelines rather than
mandates, and emphasized interpretations of final agency action that ren-
dered review under section 706 unavailable, despite evidence that the
BLM's inaction could cause irreparable harm to ecosystems the agency was
bound to protect.
C. Montana Wilderness Association
The Ninth Circuit's decision in MWA signaled a change in the court's
approach to 706(1) claims brought where an agency had taken partial ac-
tion. The MWA court held plaintiff wilderness associations had a colorable
claim under section 706(1) "failure to act" provisions of the APA, despite
the fact the Forest Service had taken "some action" to address its duties
under the 1977 Montana Wilderness Study Act ("MWSA"). 7 In doing so,
the Ninth Circuit revisited the issue of threshold jurisdiction under APA
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1138.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1139.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1140.
77. MWA, 314F.3d 1146 at 1151.
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section 706, weakening its earlier holding in Ecology Center, and poten-
tially breathing new life into section 706(1) claims.78
In MWA, plaintiff wilderness associations challenged the Forest Service's
interim management of seven Wilderness Study Areas ("WSA"s). The
MWSA charged the Forest Service with maintaining the WSAs' wilderness
characteristics until the time when Congress decided to designate the WSAs
as wilderness, or release them for other use.79 Plaintiffs alleged the Forest
Service violated the MWSA by failing to maintain the WSAs' wilderness
characteristics, and thus their potential for wilderness designation, when it
"allowed, encouraged, and/or failed to act to prevent motorized vehicle use
of the Study Areas beyond what existed in 1977. "80 Plaintiffs also alleged
the Forest Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously by maintaining WSA
trails in a manner that encouraged increased off-road vehicle ("ORV") use,
which eroded the WSAs' wilderness characteristics.8'
While the district court found the Forest Service both acted arbitrarily
and capriciously under section 706(2)(a) and failed to act under section
706(1), the Ninth Circuit did not completely agree. The court of appeals
analyzed plaintiffs' section 706(2) claim first, and found the Forest Ser-
vice's specific trail maintenance could not be construed as final agency
action, because it did not "mark the consummation of the [Forest Service's]
decision-making process.' '82 The court found the legislative history of the
MWSA suggested Congress intended forest and travel management plans to
be the consummation of the decision making process; thus maintenance of
trails designated by those plans was merely an interim aspect of the plan-
ning process, not its consummation.83 The court also turned to the APA's
definitions, holding trail maintenance did not fit any statutorily defined
categories for agency action.84
The court, however, looked more favorably on plaintiffs' section 706(1)
claim, finding judicial review appropriate where plaintiffs showed "'agency
recalcitrance in the face of a clear statutory duty or of such a magnitude that
it amounts to an abdication of statutory responsibility.' ' 85 The Forest Ser-
vice argued its duties under MWSA were discretionary, rendering judicial
86
review inappropriate.
The MWA court took pains to distinguish ONRC and Ecology Center. In
ONRC, the Ninth Circuit found BLM action was not subject to judicial re-
view, because unlike the MWSA, FLPMA is not a "clear statutory man-
78. Interview with Sarah McMillan, Attorney, Tuholske Law Office (March 27, 2003).
79. 314 F.3d at 1148 (citing Pub. L. 95-150, 91 Stat. 1243 (1977)).
80. Id. at 1149.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1150 (citing Bennet v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177).
83. Id.
84. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 551(13)).
85. Id. (citing 150 F.3d at 1137).
86. Id. at 1151.
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date"-it merely sets forth policy statements and general guidance. In con-
trast, the court found the MWSA did more than provide mere policy state-
ment or general guidance; it established a management directive requiring
the Forest Service to administer WSAs so as to "maintain" wilderness char-
acter and potential for inclusion in wilderness system. 87 Unlike the re-
quested moratorium in ONRC, the Forest Service's duty to maintain wil-
derness character and potential was a nondiscretionary, mandatory duty that
it could be compelled to carry out under section 706(1).
The MWA court distinguished Ecology Center on additional grounds.
The Ecology Center court held the Forest Service had not failed to act by
falling short of its NEPA-imposed monitoring duties and its own imple-
menting regulations, because it had "performed extensive monitoring and
provided detailed reports recounting its observations," even though it
"failed to conduct its duty in strict conformance with regulation."88 The
MWA court found the Forest Service had not performed its obligations in
the "extensive and detailed manner" it had in Ecology Center, holding
"[t]he simple fact that the Forest Service has taken some action to address
the Act is not sufficient to remove this case from section 706(1) review. 89
The MWA court thus emphasized not only the nature of the mandate with
which the Forest Service was bound to comply, but also the quality of the
action it took in any efforts towards compliance. The court held the Forest
Service had a "duty... to maintain a specified goal," and that the record did
"not demonstrate that the Forest Service performed its obligations in an
extensive and detailed manner." Partial action towards a goal satisfied the
Ecology Center court; it did not satisfy the MWA court. Although the MWA
court distinguished ONRC and Ecology Center, it appears to have departed
from the reasoning it applied in those earlier cases.
D. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance
These Ninth Circuit cases show the difficulty of discerning a true failure
to act, and a clear congressional mandate. MWA provided some clarity after
ONRC and Ecology Center, but left the issues surrounding review of inac-
tion under section 706(1) largely unresolved. A Tenth Circuit opinion, pre-
ceding MWA by only a few months, has provided the vehicle that has taken
these issues to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court heard oral argument
March 29, 2004 and should issue a decision in June 2004.
SUWA v. Bureau of Land Management was brought under facts very
similar MWA, addressing interim management of wilderness study areas.90




90. 301 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 2002).
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properly managing ORV use in WSAs. As with the Forest Service in
MWA, the BLM was responsible for managing lands designated by Con-
gress as WSAs. FLPMA charged the agency with a mandatory duty to
"manage [WSAs]... in a manner so as not to impair the suitability of such
areas for preservation as wilderness." 91 As in MWA, the agency had taken
some steps towards protecting wilderness qualities in WSAs, such as clos-
ing certain roads to ORVs, and posting signs indicating ORV use was pro-
hibited in certain areas.92
SUWA alleged BLM had failed its duty to protect the WSAs' wilderness
characteristics by allowing escalating ORV use to damage wilderness quali-
ties. Plaintiffs claimed BLM had violated its clear, nondiscretionary duty
under FLPMA to manage WSAs in such a way that their wilderness values
were not impaired, and asked the court to compel BLM to comply with this
nonimpairment mandate.93
BLM argued action could not be compelled under § 706(1) of the APA
because the mandate was discretionary-and insisted it possessed discretion
not only over how it would act, but whether it would act. 94 BLM also con-
tended § 706(1) jurisdiction could be invoked only where "final, legally
binding actions have been... unlawfully withheld or unreasonably de-
layed."95 Third, BLM argued SUWA did not challenge a true failure to act
on BLM's part, but merely the sufficiency of BLM's efforts to prevent im-
pairment.96
The court first acknowledged that although it must give BLM consider-
able deference in its interpretation of the nonimpairment mandate, the
nonimpairment obligation remained mandatory, and BLM's actions were
appropriate for judicial review. 97 Moreover, although BLM possessed dis-
cretion over the manner in which it implemented the mandate, it did not
possess discretion over whether to implement the mandate.98
The court also found BLM "read finality in an inappropriately cramped
manner" when it argued section 706(1) only applied to "final, legally bind-
ing actions that have been unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed." 99
The court rejected BLM's argument that under section 706(1) the action to
be compelled must itself be a final action. Instead, the court reasoned, when
an agency unreasonably delays in fulfilling its duty to carry out a manda-
tory, nondiscretionary duty, or if an established statutory duty lapses, "the
agency's inaction under these circumstances is, in essence, the same as if
91. Id. at 1224-25 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c)).
92. Id. at 1230.
93. Id. at 1221.
94. Id. at 1227.
95. Id.
96. ld.
97. Id. at 1227-28
98. Id. at 1228.
99. Id. at 1228-29.
[Vol. 25
2004] CHALLENGING INCOMPLETE AGENCY ACTION 127
the agency had issued a final order or rule declaring that it would not com-
plete its legally required duty."' ° Thus, when an agency fails to carry out a
mandatory, nondiscretionay duty either by an established deadline or
within a reasonable time period, this failure constitutes final agency action,
"even if the agency may have hypothetically carried out its duty through
some 'non-final' action."' '
Finally, like the MWA court, the SUWA court held "partial efforts toward
completing a legally required duty do not prevent a court from compelling
action under 706(1).y102 The SUWA court reasoned that adopting BLM's
argument, that taking some action removes a claim from section 706(1)
review, would create the rule that "as long as an agency makes some effort
to meet its legal obligations, even if that effort falls short of satisfying the
legal requirement, it cannot be compelled to fulfill its mandatory, legal
duty." 10 3 Although the court conceded BLM should be credited for actions
it had taken to comply with the mandate, it did not consider those actions an
escape hatch from section 706(1) jurisdiction. Unlike the MWA court, the
SUWA court openly disagreed with the Ecology Center opinion. While the
Ecology Center court had refused to compel the Forest Service to act in
strict compliance with its forest plan and federal regulations, reasoning that
to do so "would discourage the Forest Service from producing ambitious
forest plans," the SUWA court rejected such policy considerations.' °4 For
the SUWA court, the question was whether the agency had unlawfully with-
held a legally required, nondiscretionary duty-not "whether certain out-
comes would be discouraged or encouraged."' 10
5
The SUWA court also addressed the cases the Ecology Center court had
cited for its proposition that plaintiffs brought a mere sufficiency case, chal-
lenging the adequacy of the Forest Service's action, rather than attempting
to compel true inaction. For example, Ecology Center quoted Public Citizen
v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which warned that "'[a]lmost any ob-
jection to agency action can be dressed up as an agency's failure to act,"'
and "caution[ed] courts against entertaining section 706(1) suits where an
agency has taken some action."'' 0 6 The Ecology Center court also cited the
Ninth Circuit case, Nevada v. Watkins, which used Public Citizen's
"dressed up" language. 107 The SUWA court, however, readily distinguished
both cases from the one at bar.
In Public Citizen, the court noted, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
had issued nonbinding regulations pertaining to training nuclear power
100. Id. at 1229.
101. Id. at 1229-30.
102. Id. at 1236.
103. Id. at 1231.
104. Id. (citing 192 F.3d at 926).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1232 (citing 845 F.2d 1105, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
107. Id. (citing 939 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1991)).
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plant personnel, rather than the binding regulations it was required by stat-
ute to issue. Appellants in that case sued to compel the agency to issue
binding regulations, but they did not do so in time. Federal statute required
an appellant challenging final agency action or an alleged failure to act to
bring suit within 180 days of the agency's decision or inaction. Here, ap-
pellants missed that deadline, and the court's analysis focused on whether
issuance of the non-binding regulations were sufficient to start the 180 day
statute of limitations, not whether the agency's issuance of non-binding
regulations insulated it from section 706(1) review.
08
The SUWA court also found Nevada v. Watkins inapposite, because the
Watkins court simply held issuing preliminary guidelines for a nuclear regu-
latory disposal site was not a final agency action, where the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act specifically declared such action could not be deemed final
agency action.1°9 The SUWA court, lacking such a clear congressional de-
termination, rejected BLM's contentions that either case stood for the
proposition that because BLM took some steps to address impairment
caused by ORV use, it was immune from section 706(1) review.110 The
SUWA court, like the MWA court, held that partial steps towards completion
of a goal did not constitute the sort of action that would remove an issue
from section 706(1) jurisdiction.
Judge McKay dissented at length, writing that the majority's opinion in-
appropriately expanded section 706(1) jurisdiction."' The dissent argued
this expansion would lead to the "unwarranted conclusion that any manda-
tory agency obligation is amenable to attack pursuant to [section] 706(1) of
the APA.""' 2 The dissent compared the court's ability to grant injunctive
relief under section 706(1) to mandamus relief, which is available "to com-
pel an administrative agency to act where it has failed to perform a nondis-
cretionary, ministerial duty.""' 3 Although Judge McKay agreed with the
majority that the BLM's FLPMA duty was both mandatory and continuous,
he asserted that it was not a ministerial duty, which can involve no "exer-
cise of personal judgment upon the propriety of the act."'" 4 Because the
BLM had a substantial amount of discretion in the way it carried out its
nonimpairment mandate, the dissent found its duty not even "remotely"
ministerial and thus inappropriate for review under section 706(1)."' Judge
McKay also took issue with the majority's "unwarranted expansion of 'fail-
ure to act,"' which, he argued, extended the APA's definition of failure to
act to include "not only true agency inaction, but also all agency action
108. Id (citing 845 F.2d at 1107, 1108).
109. Id (citing 939 F.2d at 714 n. 11).
110. Id. at 1233.
111. Id. at 1240.
112. Id.
113. Id. (citing Marathon Oil Co., Inc. v. Babbit, 117 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 1997)).
114. Id. at 1241 (citing Webster's Third Internat'l Dictionary (1986)).
115. Id.
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which falls short of completely achieving the agency's obligations."" 6 The
dissent returned to the language employed by the Ecology Center and Wat-
kins courts, classifying plaintiffs claims as "complaints about the suffi-
ciency of an agency action disguised as failure to act claims." '" 7 To the dis-
sent, the "essential inquiry" when considering whether section 706(1) juris-
diction should be invoked, is whether agency took any action "reasonably
calculated to achieve the ends of its mandate." '" 8
IV. CONCLUSION
The BLM appealed the Tenth Circuit's decision, and the Supreme Court
heard oral arguments March 29, 2004. Its decision will have profound im-
plications for public land management, especially in wilderness study areas,
where the present actions or inactions of agencies will determine these
lands' suitability for future wilderness designation. The Court's decision
should answer the questions of jurisdiction over an agency's partial action,
and what exactly constitutes final action in land management cases.
The government argues that under section 706(1) of the APA, courts may
compel only the same sort of final agency action that a court may "set
aside" under section 706(2).'9 Under the government's logic, because the
APA confines judicial review to challenges to final agency action, and de-
fines agency action as "'includ[ing] the whole or part of an agency rule,
order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure
to act,' ' 1 20 the term "failure to act" is "properly understood to refer to a
failure to promulgate a rule, issue an order, or take other discrete action of
the sort identified in [s]ection 551(13).,,121 The APA, however, does not
limit "failure to act" to the failure to take such a final discrete formal ac-
tion. 22 Instead, by enabling courts to compel action unlawfully withheld or
unreasonably delayed, section 706(1) provides remedy for a final failure to
act, not a failure to take a discrete final action. For 706(1) to apply, an
agency must have withheld an action unlawfully, or delayed that action so
unreasonably it has effectively failed to act, whether or not the contem-
plated action, if taken, would itself be a "final" action.
The government also asserts that because compelling action under sec-
tion 706(1) is analogous to mandamus practice, it "does not permit a court
to interfere with an agency's judgment or discretion,"'' 23 and therefore only
non-discretionary or "ministerial" action may be compelled under section
116. Id. at 1243.
117. Id. at 1244.
118. Id.
119. See Br. of Pet., supra n. 12, at 15.
120. Id. at 15 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 551(13)).
121. Id. at 15-16.
122. Br. of Amici Curiae, supra n. 31, at 10.
123. See Br. of Pet., supra n. 12, at 12.
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706(1).24 The government correctly notes that under 706(1), a court may
compel an agency to act, but may not tell it how to act in matters of admin-
istrative discretion. 25 The concept of administrative discretion, however,
should not be stretched to exempt an agency from review where it has ig-
nored congressional mandate. Even traditional mandamus practice admits
of shades of gray in the quality of an agency's discretion. Although in man-
damus actions the action to be commanded must be "ministerial," or in-
volve no element of "discretion," preeminent administrative scholar Louis
Jaffe cautioned:
"[T]he notion that each administrative act can be classified
a priori either as 'ministerial' or 'discretionary' is unsound
and unworkable... The classification is illusory... [T]he
fact that there may be discretionary elements present does
not, or at least should not, exclude judicial review, whether
by mandamus or other appropriate remedy, where legally
irrelevant or forbidden considerations have determined the
decision."
' 126
Certainly agencies like the Forest Service or the BLM, as land manage-
ment experts, possess discretion over the way in which they implement
congressional mandates. They do not, however, possess the discretion to
decide whether or not to implement those mandates-be it the BLM's non-
impairment mandate under FLPMA, or the Forest Service's duty under the
MWSA, to maintain the wilderness characteristics of wilderness study ar-
eas.
Although the government cautions that allowing review of an agency's
partial actions towards a congressional mandate will create a claim "ever
ripe" for review, it is the converse that should be of concern. If courts are
not permitted to review an agency's failure to comply with statutory man-
date-simply because the agency has taken some steps, no matter how fee-
ble, towards that mandate-legitimate claims will never be ripe, and agen-
cies will be able to shirk congressional command with impunity.
124. Id. at 26-29.
125. Id. at 22.
126. Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 181 (Little, Brown and Company,
Boston 1965).
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